Exhibit 218

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1	CONFIDENTIAL - EVAN MILAZZO 30(b)(6)
2	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
	FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
3	
	In re:
4	: Master File No.
	Global Brokerage, Inc. : 1:17-cv-00916-RA
5	F/k/a FXCM, Inc. :
	Securities Litigation :
6	:
7	
8	REMOTE VIDEO DEPOSITION VIA ZOOM OF:
9	EVAN MILAZZO PURSUANT TO RULE 30(b)(6)
10	TUESDAY, DECEMBER 1, 2020
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24	REPORTED BY:
	SILVIA P. WAGE, CCR, CRR, RPR
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2	M-cast bus, how does that differ from the	2	(Stenographer clarification.)
3	information that would have been placed in the	3	A software considerations. So, from
4	drop copies?	4	a networking standpoint, there had to be let's
5	A. The information that was placed in	5	call them holes in the firewall that were opened
6	the drop copies were confirmed trades that had	6	up, specifically, throughout EFFEX to access
7	already been booked and the information that was	7	parts of the system that we were providing them
8	available on multicast bus would have been quotes	8	with access to. And, furthermore, from a
9	that were delivered by liquidity providers to	9	software standpoint, there had to be integration
10	FXCM. The best bid and offer stream that was	10	that allowed EFFEX to receive the messages that
11	generated based off of those quotes and then	11	we were sending to them.
12	orders that had been matched by FXCM and were in	12	Q. Did FXCM create holes in the
13	route to a liquidity provider.	13	firewall, as you put it, for any other liquidity
14	Q. So information about quotes that were	14	providers than EFFEX?
15	delivered by liquidity providers to FXCM would	15	A. Not to my knowledge. But we may have
16	have been accessible to EFFEX through the	16	had it been requested.
17	multicast bus; is that correct?	17	Q. To your knowledge, was it ever
18	A. Yes, that's correct.	18	requested?
19	Q. Was this information available to any	19	A. Not to my knowledge.
20	other liquidity providers?	20	Q. Did EFFEX ever extend the offer to
21	A. Not the information of the individual	21	make this information available to any liquidity
22	quotes from the liquidity providers but the best	22	provider other than EFFEX?
23	bid and offer that was formed out of those quotes	23	MR. DAHAN: Objection to form. I
24	from the liquidity providers was available to	24	think you need to repeat your question.
25	other liquidity providers and had been provided	25	MR. LaPOINTE: Sorry.
		+	•
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2	to other liquidity providers at points in time.	2	Q. Did FXCM ever extend the offer to
3	But the reason that we provided the quotes to	3	make this information available to any liquidity
4	EFFEX was because of the high level of quality	4	provider other than EFFEX?
5	and service and execution that they provided,	5	A. I'm not certain.
6			
	which was far beyond what the other liquidity	6	Q. How would EFFEX have accessed this
7	which was far beyond what the other liquidity providers were able to.	6 7	Q. How would EFFEX have accessed this information?
7 8	which was far beyond what the other liquidity providers were able to. Q. But this information wouldn't have	6 7 8	Q. How would EFFEX have accessed this information? MR. DAHAN: Objection to form.
7 8 9	which was far beyond what the other liquidity providers were able to. Q. But this information wouldn't have been provided to other liquidity providers in a	6 7 8 9	Q. How would EFFEX have accessed this information?MR. DAHAN: Objection to form.A. So, as I mentioned earlier, we
7 8 9 10	which was far beyond what the other liquidity providers were able to. Q. But this information wouldn't have been provided to other liquidity providers in a realtime fashion, correct?	6 7 8 9 10	Q. How would EFFEX have accessed this information? MR. DAHAN: Objection to form. A. So, as I mentioned earlier, we created firewall access rules that they were able
7 8 9 10 11	which was far beyond what the other liquidity providers were able to. Q. But this information wouldn't have been provided to other liquidity providers in a realtime fashion, correct? MR. DAHAN: Objection to form.	6 7 8 9 10 11	Q. How would EFFEX have accessed this information? MR. DAHAN: Objection to form. A. So, as I mentioned earlier, we created firewall access rules that they were able to gain access to the information and assisted in
7 8 9 10 11 12	which was far beyond what the other liquidity providers were able to. Q. But this information wouldn't have been provided to other liquidity providers in a realtime fashion, correct? MR. DAHAN: Objection to form. A. The best bid and offer was provided	6 7 8 9 10 11 12	Q. How would EFFEX have accessed this information? MR. DAHAN: Objection to form. A. So, as I mentioned earlier, we created firewall access rules that they were able to gain access to the information and assisted in the development of software integration in order
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2	important factors for them to be able to compete	2	you know, the time period that we're looking at
3	effectively is the speed of their system and	3	for the data in this memorandum was from
4	speed of their networking.	4	April 2011 to January 2015. So it was a gradual
5	So, as a result of EFFEX being able	5	process as those liquidity providers made
6	to have much shorter roundtrip time, so lower	6	co-location available and then set up their
7	latency than the other liquidity providers, they	7	networking that facilitated that co-location. So
8	started to compete more actively and it became	8	I don't remember exactly when each one of them
9	much more common place for liquidity providers to	9	did it. By 2015 most if not all would have, but
10	be co-located with us as well.	10	it would have been a gradual process one
11	So, at this point in time, there's	11	liquidity provider at a time during that period
12	not a single liquidity provider we deal with who	12	of time.
13	is not co-located in one of the Equinix data	13	Q. And here it discusses that
14	centers in North Bergen, New Jersey like we are.	14	historically liquidity providers would not agree
15	At the time that we first started integrating	15	because of their own IT security policies.
16	with EFFEX, I don't remember if there were any.	16	Do you see that?
17	But it certainly was nowhere near, you know,	17	A. Yes, I do.
18	majority of the liquidity providers who were. So	18	Q. Did any of FXCM's liquidity providers
19	it definitely had a positive impact for our	19	other than EFFEX express what issues co-location
20	customer base in total because of the reductions	20	would pose to their internal security policies?
21	in latency that we had across all the LPs or	20	
$\begin{vmatrix} 21\\22\end{vmatrix}$	•	22	A. I don't recall ever being part of
23	liquidity providers.	23	conversations related to that. But I can say that in order to have the trust to be able to
23	Q. And at the time that this was sent,	24	
25	was EFFEX the only liquidity provider that was co-located with FXCM servers?	25	deploy your systems outside the data center that
23			you're managing entirely, you have to put the
1	Page 115		Page 117
1 2	CONFIDENTIAL - EVAN MILAZZO 30(b)(6) A. No, definitely not. By this point	1 2	CONFIDENTIAL - EVAN MILAZZO 30(b)(6)
3	most if not all of the liquidity providers had	3	trust into hosting company like Equinix and
4	been co-located.	4	there's a reason why if you take a look at
			Equinix's publically traded stock, for example, it started to skyrocket in price in the, you
5	Q. So moving onto the next paragraph, which begins, subparagraph B. "EFFEX has	5	
6		6	know, 2011, 2012 period, as more of these
7	co-located to FXCM's servers. FXCM requested	7	companies started to co-locate there and high
8	similar arrangements with other liquidity providers. However, other liquidity providers	8	frequency trading became common.
9	providers. However, other liquidity providers		0 1 11 11 11
10		9	So, because we were dealing with
10	historically would not agree because of their own	10	large multi-national banks who have very very
11	historically would not agree because of their own internal IT security policies. Co-location	10 11	large multi-national banks who have very very strict requirements for security, they would have
11 12	historically would not agree because of their own internal IT security policies. Co-location dramatically reduces the normal communication	10 11 12	large multi-national banks who have very very strict requirements for security, they would have been much more hesitant to move forward with
11 12 13	historically would not agree because of their own internal IT security policies. Co-location dramatically reduces the normal communication delays associated with Internet connections	10 11 12 13	large multi-national banks who have very very strict requirements for security, they would have been much more hesitant to move forward with trusting a third-party company for the hosting of
11 12 13 14	historically would not agree because of their own internal IT security policies. Co-location dramatically reduces the normal communication delays associated with Internet connections between a liquidity provider and FXCM,	10 11 12 13 14	large multi-national banks who have very very strict requirements for security, they would have been much more hesitant to move forward with trusting a third-party company for the hosting of its services. So that's just a natural kind of
11 12 13 14 15	historically would not agree because of their own internal IT security policies. Co-location dramatically reduces the normal communication delays associated with Internet connections between a liquidity provider and FXCM, dramatically reducing the instances of rejections	10 11 12 13 14 15	large multi-national banks who have very very strict requirements for security, they would have been much more hesitant to move forward with trusting a third-party company for the hosting of its services. So that's just a natural kind of evolution of the market that was, you know,
11 12 13 14 15 16	historically would not agree because of their own internal IT security policies. Co-location dramatically reduces the normal communication delays associated with Internet connections between a liquidity provider and FXCM, dramatically reducing the instances of rejections due to fast/volatile market movement and	10 11 12 13 14 15 16	large multi-national banks who have very very strict requirements for security, they would have been much more hesitant to move forward with trusting a third-party company for the hosting of its services. So that's just a natural kind of evolution of the market that was, you know, predicated by the fact that some providers like
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11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	historically would not agree because of their own internal IT security policies. Co-location dramatically reduces the normal communication delays associated with Internet connections between a liquidity provider and FXCM, dramatically reducing the instances of rejections due to fast/volatile market movement and dramatically increasing the ability of FXCM's clients to obtain the best bid/offer displayed by FXCM." Do you see that? A. Yes, I do. Q. So, at the time this was written, other liquidity providers had already begun to	10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	large multi-national banks who have very very strict requirements for security, they would have been much more hesitant to move forward with trusting a third-party company for the hosting of its services. So that's just a natural kind of evolution of the market that was, you know, predicated by the fact that some providers like EFFEX started co-locating first and the others had to catch up afterwards. Q. When other price providers began to co-locate with EFFEX, did they receive the same enhanced access to FXCM's systems that EFFEX was granted, as described in earlier in your testimony?
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2	repeat that question. I think you said when	2	exactly the same way so that the frequency with
3	EFFEX co-located with other liquidity providers.	3	updates and the best bid and offer doesn't depend
4	MR. LaPOINTE: Let me make sure.	4	on the latency from the liquidity provider
5	I'll strike the previous one and attempt to	5	itself.
6	rephrase.	6	Q. So moving on to the paragraph below
7	MR. DAHAN: Okay.	7	that labeled, "Depth of Liquidity." This begins,
8	Q. Would other price providers sorry.	8	"FXCM insists that EFFEX match the best bid or
9	When other price providers began to	9	best offer from FXCM's other liquidity providers
10	co-locate with EFFEX, did they receive the same	10	over 80 percent of the time for major currency
11	enhanced access to being FXCM's systems that	11	payors and almost 100 percent of the time for
12	EFFEX was granted as described earlier in your	12	currency crosses."
13	testimony?	13	Do you see that?
14	MR. DAHAN: Brent, again, they don't	14	A. Yes, I do.
15	co-locate with EFFEX. I think you meant did they	15	Q. How was this accomplished, this
16	co-locate with FXCM.	16	insistence?
17	MR. LaPOINTE: That may be true.	17	A. How was the insistence accomplished?
18	Strike again.	18	Q. Yes.
19	Q. Would other price providers when	19	A. So we had a liquidity management team
20	other price providers began to co-locate with	20	who corresponded regularly with all of our
21	FXCM, did they receive the same enhanced access	21	liquidity providers. If this was one of the
22	to FXCM's systems that EFFEX was granted that was	22	objectives that was set forth for EFFEX, than
23	described earlier in your testimony?	23	that would have been communicated to them and
24	A. So, no, that's not just a natural	24	then we would have been monitoring that through
25	effect of co-location itself. EFFEX was still	25	the reports that the liquidity management team
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1	CONFIDENTIAL - EVAN MILAZZO 30(b)(6)	1	CONFIDENTIAL - EVAN MILAZZO 30(b)(6)
2	providing higher quality service in terms of	2	put together to communicate that to EFFEX and
3	pricing, execution, rejection rates, et cetera,	3	make sure that they were upholding that metric.
4	than the other providers. Like I said earlier,	4	Q. Was there a written agreement between
5	if they had requested it, we would have	5	FXCM and EFFEX that proscribed that metric?
6	considered it. But just as a result of	6	A. I'm not certain.
7	co-location, that didn't happen.	7	Q. Alright. I'm going to show you
8	Q. But, to your knowledge, no other	8	another document.
9	liquidity providers ever requested it?	9	MR. DAHAN: Yeah, Brent, just so you
10	MR. DAHAN: Requested what?	10	know, I'm going to cut out in five minutes. I
11	MR. LaPOINTE: That enhanced access.	11	have a client call for a half hour, but Chelsea
12	MR. DAHAN: Oh, okay.	12	will continue.
13	A. Yeah, again, I'm not sure.	13	MR. LaPOINTE: Okay.
14	Q. As a result of reduced latency during	14	MR. DAHAN: And I'll be back around
15	the time when EFFEX was the sole price provider	15	4:45.
16	that was co-located with FXCM's servers, were	16	MR. LaPOINTE: That's fine. I'll
17	EFFEX's changes in pricing reflected more quickly	17	expect we'll still be going at that point.
18	than other liquidity providers?	18	(Deposition Exhibit 15, e-mail to
19	A. Yes, they would have been, if you	19	Matt Childers from Alexander Dick GLBR_00041753
119	look at it from the perspective of how long it	20	to GLBR_00041757 marked Confidential, was marked
		20	
20		21	
20 21	took for that quote to get from EFFEX to the FXCM	21	for identification.)
20 21 22	took for that quote to get from EFFEX to the FXCM system versus how long it took for the quote to	22	Q. So I'm marking this as Exhibit
20 21	took for that quote to get from EFFEX to the FXCM		